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PERPETUAL FINALITY: IN IMMIGRATION
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS, MOTIONS TO
REOPEN CREATE MORE PROBLEMS
THAN THEY SOLVE
By: Robert L. Koehl
ABSTRACT
Immigrants who have been ordered removed may challenge their final re-
moval order by filing a motion for the court to reopen their case.  Motions to
reopen removal cases are common within the immigration system, but offer
little chance for an alien to actually receive relief.  These motions are typically
subject to strict time and numerical limitations.  And the legal bases for re-
opening an immigrant’s case render the alien’s chances unlikely.
Current statute and case law provide seven grounds for an immigrant to
reopen a case.  These grounds stem from United States Code, the Code of
Federal Regulations, and the Board of Immigration Appeals’ precedential
case law.  Some of these grounds require such a perfect storm of unlikely cir-
cumstances that reopening becomes de facto impossible for an alien to attain.
Some grounds are confusing, with requirements that are difficult for aliens,
their attorneys, or even judges to understand.  The remaining grounds have
bright-line rules but are couched in ambiguous language.  This leads attorneys
to pursue reopening in cases that do not merit reopening, but seem to merit
reopening because of the ambiguity.
This Comment outlines the current legal bases for an alien seeking to reo-
pen a removal case.  It will explore the problems and shortcomings inherent to
these bases.  And it will recommend reforms to the current structure which will
render the immigration post-conclusion structure fairer to the alien, clearer for
the private attorneys, and more efficient for the government.
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I. INTRODUCTION
People often use the word “broken” to describe the United States
immigration system.1  Unfortunately, previous attempts to fix it have
focused on sweeping changes to overhaul the entire system, often
missing the smaller details such as the myriad procedures that make
up immigration enforcement.2  One such detail that has consistently
eluded politicians, but accounts for a large portion of the resources
exhausted on immigration removal procedure, is post-conclusion re-
lief.  This typically takes the form of a motion to reopen3 or a motion
to reconsider.4  Motions to reconsider focus on the narrow topic of
legal or factual error in an immigration hearing.5  Motions to reopen
1. LaJuana Davis, Reconsidering Remedies for Ensuring Competent Representa-
tion in Removal Proceedings, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 123, 137–38 (2009).
2. Lenni B. Benson, You Can’t Get There from Here: Managing Judicial Review
of Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 405–06 (“Congress and policy ana-
lysts must stop hunting for the magical alchemy that can transform immigration law
enforcement into a perfect or ‘golden’ system . . . we must turn our energies into
energies to developing a better understanding of the fundamental elements that com-
bine or divide and shape the existing process . . . the statutory approaches reflect a
search for a miracle ‘mercury’ . . . .”).
3. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (2012).
4. See § 1229a(c)(6).
5. § 1229a(c)(6)(C).
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exist in much broader circumstances6 and are thus more common.  As
such, this Comment will focus on motions to reopen.
In fiscal 2012, immigration courts received 14,758 motions to reo-
pen, which was comparable to each of the previous four years.7  The
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) received an additional 7,090
motions to reopen and 1,829 appeals from an Immigration Judge’s
(“IJ’s”) denial of a motion to reopen.8  These numbers were also com-
parable to each of the prior four years.9
This reveals a problem on many levels.  First, it clogs up the immi-
gration courts, further delaying a process that already presents aliens
with a multi-year delay in seeking relief and closure.  Second, it wastes
government resources responding to, and adjudicating, these motions.
And in many cases it also shows immigration attorneys taking money
from aliens to pursue hopeless motions with little chance of success.
The current framework allows this.  But minor reforms to existing
statutes, regulations, and case law could create more efficient struc-
ture.  Such reforms would promote finality while providing a more
solid relief avenue to aliens who merit it.
This Comment will address issues inherent to the current frame-
work for motions to reopen, and recommend possible solutions.  The
first section of this Comment will provide an overview of immigration
removal procedures and the current legal bases for motions to reopen.
The second section will discuss the problems with the existing legal
grounds for reopening an immigration case.  The third section will
make recommendations for changes that Congress, the Attorney Gen-
eral, or the BIA could implement to streamline and improve post-
conclusion motions practice.  These recommended changes are: (1) re-
move all discretionary bases for reopening, and replace them with
mandatory bases; (2) establish and clarify bright-line rules for all bases
for reopening; and (3) create and enforce stronger penalties for attor-
neys who file frivolous post-conclusion motions.
II. THE KINDERGARTENER’S GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION PROCEDURE
AND MOTIONS TO REOPEN
To understand the problems inherent in the current post-conclusion
structure, one must first understand the basics of immigration enforce-
ment and where these motions fit into that process.  For that reason,
this section provides a quick overview of the agencies involved in im-
migration enforcement, the legal process by which the government
6. See § 1229a(c)(7)(B)–(C).
7. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE: EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2012 STA-
TISTICAL YEAR BOOK at B7 (March 2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy
12syb.pdf.
8. Id. at T1.
9. Id.
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removes immigrants, and the current forms of post-conclusion relief
available to immigrants who have been ordered removed.
A. Immigration Enforcement – The People
Two federal agencies share immigration enforcement responsibili-
ties: the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)10 and the De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”).11  DHS handles the majority of
enforcement issues through its various subdivisions.12  The U.S. Citi-
zenship and Immigration Services (“CIS”) division handles lawful im-
migration.13  Several other DHS subdivisions arrest and detain aliens
suspected of “inadmissibility” or “removability.”14  But the Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) division prosecutes removal
cases in immigration court and represents the government in all re-
moval hearings.15
The DOJ adjudicates these contested removal hearings because the
U.S. Attorney General has the final word on most removal matters
within the immigration enforcement administrative process.16  The
DOJ division dealing directly with immigration is the Executive Office
for Immigration Review (“EOIR”).17  Removal adjudication occurs
within this DOJ division.18  EOIR operates fifty-nine immigration
courts, which hear cases including removals, asylum applications, and
adjustments of status.19  The BIA oversees these immigration courts,
and is the highest authority within EOIR.20  The BIA is the final Arti-
cle I administrative body in which immigration matters may be dis-
puted without going into an Article III courtroom.21  The BIA handles
other matters as well, such as disciplining attorneys who appear in im-
migration courts.22
10. See § 1103(a) (2009) (outlining DHS’s responsibilities).
11. See § 1103(g) (outlining DOJ’s responsibilities).
12. See § 1103(a).
13. What We Do, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., http://www.uscis.gov/
about-us/what-we-do (last updated Sept. 2, 2009).
14. See infra notes and accompanying text 24–28 (discussing inadmissibility and
removability).
15. History of ICE, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.
ice.gov/history/index.htm (last visited Feb 22, 2014).
16. § 1103(g).
17. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0 (2007) (establishing EOIR within the DOJ).
18. Id.
19. EOIR at a Glance, DEP’T. OF JUSTICE: EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION RE-
VIEW (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press/2010/EOIRataGlance09092010
.htm.
20. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (2009) (outlining the BIA’s jurisdiction).
21. Id.
22. See DEP’T. OF JUSTICE: EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FACT
SHEET: EOIR’S DISCIPLINARY PROGRAM AND PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULES FOR
IMMIGRATION ATTORNEYS AND REPRESENTATIVES (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.justice
.gov/eoir/press/2013/EOIRsDisciplinaryProgramFactSheet02272013.pdf; see also 8
C.F.R. § 292.3 (1996).
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B. Immigration Enforcement – The Process23
There are two types of aliens subject to removal procedures: inad-
missible aliens24 and removable aliens.25  Inadmissible aliens are those
who are here illegally, and those trying to come to the United States
despite ineligibility or lack of documentation.26  Removable aliens are
generally those who have committed certain crimes27 or failed to com-
ply with the conditions of their admission.28  Being either inadmissible
or removable will subject an alien to removal proceedings, so the first
issue in the immigration enforcement process concerns whether an
alien falls into one of those two categories.29
Removal proceedings begin with the issuance of a Notice to Appear
(“NTA”).30  This document informs the alien of the specific grounds
for inadmissibility or removability which the government is alleging.31
While many divisions of DHS may create an NTA and provide it to
the alien,32 ICE is primarily responsible for filing NTAs with the court
and it may cancel the NTA for any reason prior to filing.33  Once ICE
has filed the NTA, the EOIR court assumes authority over the case.34
The EOIR court with jurisdiction over the NTA then sends the alien a
Notice of Hearing (“NOH”), providing the time and location at which
the alien must appear.35
Once the NTA is filed, the alien typically attends two types of hear-
ings.  The first is a master calendar hearing, which resembles an ar-
raignment in criminal proceedings.36  At this hearing, the court
23. Please note: The BIA has established a unique citation format for its decisions.
Where the BIA format conflicts with The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation,
citations to BIA decisions in this article defer to the BIA’s format.  BIA citation
guidelines are available at BIA. PRAC. MAN. APP. J, CITATION GUIDELINES, 2003 WL
21660505 (EOIR 2003).
24. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) (describing the grounds for inadmissibility).
25. See § 1227 (describing the grounds for removability).
26. § 1182.
27. See § 1227(a)(2) (listing criminal offenses which will justify removal).
28. See § 1227(a)(1)(C) (violating status or conditions of entry).
29. § 1229a(a)(1)–(2) (“An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for de-
ciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien . . . . An alien placed in proceed-
ings under this section may be charged with any applicable ground of inadmissibility
. . . or any applicable ground of deportability . . . .”).
30. See § 1229(a) (discussing the requirements for an NTA at the initiation of re-
moval proceedings).
31. Id.
32. See 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a) (2005) (listing those officers who are authorized to
issue an NTA).
33. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE: EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, IMMIGRATION
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL at 55 (April 1, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/
OCIJPracManual/Chap%204.pdf.
34. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) (2008) (“Jurisdiction vests, and proceedings before
an Immigration Judge commence, when a charging document is filed with the Immi-
gration Court by the Service.”).
35. PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 33, at 65.
36. Id. at 64–66.
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informs the alien of the charges, takes any pleadings, and determines
the destination country should the alien be ultimately removed.37  The
second type of hearing is a merits hearing.38  At this hearing, the alien
and government present evidence to answer two issues: (1) whether
the alien is inadmissible/removable39 and (2) whether the alien is enti-
tled to any form of relief.40  The court will often determine inadmissi-
bility/removability at the master calendar hearing, narrowing the
merits hearing to relief.41
On the first issue, the burden of proof depends on the charges.  If
the charge is inadmissibility, the alien has the burden to show lawful
presence by clear and convincing evidence.42  If the charge is remova-
bility, then the government has the burden to show removability by
clear and convincing evidence.43  If the alien is not inadmissible or
removable, then removal proceedings end, and the alien legally re-
mains in the United States.
If the court determines that an alien is inadmissible or removable,
the next question is whether the alien merits any form of relief that
may delay or prevent removal.44  The alien’s circumstances usually
dictate the available forms of relief.
If an alien fears returning to the country of origin, generally three
types of relief are available: asylum,45 withholding of removal,46 and
relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).47  Asy-
lum is the most desirable of the three.  It is a discretionary form of
relief,48 but it may lead directly to Lawful Permanent Resident
37. Id.
38. Id. at 75.
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A) (2012) (“At the conclusion of the proceeding the
immigration judge shall decide whether an alien is removable . . . .”).
40. See § 1229a(c)(4) (discussing the alien’s application for relief).
41. See generally PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 33, at 65, 67 (stating that the IJ
must “identify and narrow factual and legal issues,” and the alien may admit charges
in NTA).
42. § 1229a(c)(2)(B) (“[T]he alien has the burden of establishing . . .  by clear and
convincing evidence, that the alien is lawfully present in the United States pursuant to
a prior admission.”).
43. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (requiring that “in cases of deportable aliens . . . the Service




46. See § 1231(b)(3) (mandating that “the Attorney General may not remove an
alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom
would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”).
47. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c) (2009).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) (stating that the Secretary of Homeland Se-
curity or the Attorney General may grant asylum).
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(“LPR”) status.49  An IJ may grant asylum once the alien has proven
four elements: (1) past harm or a well-founded fear of future harm;50
(2) that the fear is based on one of five statutory grounds—race, relig-
ion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group;51 (3) that the alien filed for asylum within one year of entering
the United States;52 and (4) that the alien merits favorable discre-
tion.53  If circumstances do not justify asylum, an alien may pursue
withholding of removal instead.54  This is a mandatory form of relief,55
but it does not lead to LPR status56 unless the alien successfully pur-
sues LPR status by some other means, such as marrying a U.S. citi-
zen.57  An IJ must allow withholding if an alien can prove a threat to
either the alien’s life or freedom, which is connected to one of the five
statutory grounds.58  Finally, if the alien can only prove a fear of tor-
ture at the hands of the government (or with the government’s acqui-
escence) unrelated to any statutory grounds, the alien may pursue
CAT relief.59
If a removable/inadmissible alien wishes to remain in the United
States, but has no articulable fear of returning to the country of origin,
the alien may pursue cancellation of removal.60  This is a discretionary
form of relief61 for which the alien must first prove eligibility.62  The
elements for this relief differ depending on whether the alien is an
49. § 1159(b) (outlining conditions under which the DOJ or DHS “may adjust to
the status of alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence the status of any alien
granted asylum”).
50. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (noting circumstances where “the applicant is a refugee,
within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A)”); § 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining refugees
as those apprehensive “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution”).
51. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1101(a)(42)(A) (“[R]ace, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion”).
52. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (requiring that “unless the alien demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that the application has been filed within 1 year after the date of
the alien’s arrival in the United States”).
53. See § 1158(b)(1)(A) (employing language stating the government “may grant
asylum”) (emphasis added).
54. § 1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(a)–(b) (2009).
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2012) (stating that “the Attorney General may not
remove an alien”) (emphasis added).
56. Compare § 1159(b) (allowing asylees to adjust to LPR status) with 8 C.F.R
§ 1208.16 (omitting any reference to adjustment for withholding grantees).
57. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1255(d)–(e) (2012) (describing adjustment based on
marriage).
58. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (“[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a
country if . . . the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because
of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b) (2009).
59. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18 (2009).
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)–(b) (2012) (describing cancellation of removal).
61. See id. (employing the words “the Attorney General may” in both paragraphs)
(emphasis added).
62. See, e.g., Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, 989 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal citations
omitted).
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LPR.63  An LPR must only prove five years or more of LPR status,
seven years of continuous residency in the United States, and that the
alien has no aggravated felony convictions.64  A non-LPR must prove
ten years of continuous physical presence; good moral character; ex-
ceptional/extremely unusual hardship on certain U.S. citizen (or LPR)
family members; and no convictions for any moral turpitude crimes,
drug crimes, weapons crimes, or any acts of domestic violence.65
Once an alien has proven the elements for eligibility, the IJ then de-
termines whether the alien merits cancellation of removal as a matter
of discretion.66  Finally, certain limited circumstances may enable an
inadmissible alien illegally present within the United States to seek
adjustment of status.67
If an alien is both (a) removable/inadmissible and (b) ineligible for
any form of relief, the alien may not remain in the United States.
Not every alien may challenge their removal in proceedings before
an IJ.  Certain circumstances allow DHS to administratively remove
an alien, or subject the alien to expedited removal without going to
court.68  An Article III court may also remove an alien as part of a
criminal sentence69 or as part of a plea agreement where an alien
agrees to removal.70  And finally, if an alien has been ordered re-
moved and illegally reenters the country, the government may rein-
state the previous order, automatically rendering the alien ineligible
for any future relief.71  More critically, when an order is reinstated
under that circumstance, statute strips jurisdiction from any court to
ever revisit the prior order.72
63. See § 1229b(a)–(b) (outlining the requirements for LPRs and non-LPRs).
64. § 1229b(a) (describing cancellation of removal for LPRs).
65. § 1229b(b) (describing cancellation of removal for non-LPRs).
66. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (requiring that an “alien applying for relief or protection
from removal has the burden of proof to establish that the alien (i) satisfies the appli-
cable eligibility requirements; and (ii) with respect to any form of relief that is granted
in the exercise of discretion, that the alien merits a favorable exercise of discretion”).
67. See § 1255(i)–(j) (outlining adjustment of status from non-immigrant to LPR).
68. E.g., § 1228 (allowing expedited removal of non-LPRs convicted of aggravated
felonies).
69. § 1228(c)(1) (“[A] United States district court shall have jurisdiction to enter a
judicial order of removal at the time of sentencing against an alien who is deportable
. . . .”).
70. § 1228(c)(5) (allowing a federal prosecutor to “enter into a plea agreement
which calls for the alien, who is deportable under this chapter, to waive the right to
notice and a hearing under this section, and stipulate to the entry of a judicial order of
removal”).
71. § 1231(a)(5) (“[I]f the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the
United States illegally after having been removed or having departed voluntarily,
under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original
date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and
may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the alien shall be removed under
the prior order . . . .”).
72. Id. (“[T]he prior order of removal . . . is not subject to being reopened or
reviewed . . . .”).
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C. Motions to Reopen
Motions to reopen already exist in virtually every area of civil litiga-
tion,73 so it makes sense that such motions would also exist in immi-
gration law.  After all, immigration cases are technically civil
hearings.74  But in reality, immigration cases differ from purely civil
litigation in that they may result in life-changing consequences more
akin to a criminal hearing.75  So immigration statutes and case law
have expanded the grounds for reopening an immigration case beyond
the traditional “new evidence” requirement in most civil hearings.
Current law provides seven grounds for an alien to reopen an immi-
gration case.  Three grounds are generally available for aliens who at-
tended their hearings: the traditional “new evidence” basis;76 a new
form of relief;77 or ineffective assistance of counsel.78  Three grounds
are available for those removed in absentia: the alien never received
the NTA;79 the alien never received the NOH;80 or exceptional cir-
cumstances prevented the alien from appearing.81  An additional
ground exists for those who have been denied asylum: changed coun-
try conditions.82
1. New Evidence
A motion to reopen so that the court may consider new evidence is
the oldest and longest lasting of the post-conclusion motions.83  In
fact, EOIR still considers all motions to reopen as technically motions
to consider “previously unavailable facts or evidence.”84
73. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2) (establishing that a party may motion a court
to reopen a federal civil case based on “newly discovered evidence that, with reasona-
ble diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial”).
74. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (noting that “a deportation
proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country,
not to punish”).
75. Davis, supra note 1, at 139 (noting that immigration law differs from other
administrative hearings because of, inter alia, “the rights at stake”).
76. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1) (regarding new evidence/relief motions before the
BIA), 1003.23(b)(3) (2006) (regarding new evidence/relief motions before an IJ).
77. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3).
78. See Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637, 638 (BIA 1988), aff’d, Lozada v. INS,
857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988) (establishing the test for reopening an in absentia removal
order).
79. Matter of G-Y-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 181, 187–88 (BIA 2001).
80. See § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (“An order entered in absentia . . . may be rescinded
upon a motion to reopen filed at any time if the alien demonstrates that he or she did
not receive notice . . . .”).
81. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii)–(iii).
82. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), 1158(a)(2)(D) (2012); see also Matter of S-Y-
G-, 24 I&N Dec. 247, 252 (BIA 2007).
83. See Gerald S. Hurwitz, Motions Practice Before the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 81 (1982).
84. 2012 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 7, at H1.
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An IJ may reopen a case based on new evidence.85  The new evi-
dence (1) must be material and (2) must have been unavailable or
impossible to discover/present at the original hearing.86  The evidence
must also demonstrate a considerable likelihood that the alien will
prevail at a new hearing.87  Beyond prima facie eligibility, the alien’s
motion must also demonstrate that the alien merits favorable discre-
tion.88  Any adverse facts in the record may cause the IJ or the BIA to
deny a motion to reopen, even if the alien is otherwise eligible.89  Fi-
nally, the alien must submit the motion to reopen within ninety days
of the removal order.90  If an alien successfully demonstrates that this
previously unattainable evidence would have likely led to a favorable
result, the IJ may reopen the case for the sole purpose of hearing the
new evidence and weighing it against all evidence already admitted.
2. New Forms of Relief
An immigration court may also reopen a case based on a new form
of relief becoming available to the alien.91  As with new evidence, the
alien must demonstrate that this form of relief was unavailable at the
original hearing.92  The alien’s motion also bears the burden of dem-
onstrating prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.93  The alien must
85. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3) (2006) (“A motion to reopen shall state
the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted
. . . .”).
86. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it
appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not avail-
able and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .”);
§ 1003.23(b)(3) (stating the same standard for a motion to reopen before an IJ).
87. See Matter of R-R-, 20 I&N Dec. 547, 550 (BIA 1992) (“An alien must make a
prima facie showing both that he is statutorily eligible for the relief sought.”); see also
Matter of M-S-, 22 I&N Dec. 349, 357 (BIA 1999) (“[T]he Board will look to whether
the alien has proffered sufficient evidence to indicate that there is a reasonable likeli-
hood of success on the merits.”).
88. R-R-, 20 I&N Dec. at 550 (“An alien must make a prima facie showing . . . that
he warrants relief in the exercise of discretion.”).
89. See id. at 550–52.
90. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2006) (“[Such] motion[s] must be filed no later
than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in
the proceeding sought to be reopened . . . .”).
91. See M-S-, 22 I&N Dec. at 357 (holding that an alien may reopen because she
“presented an approved visa petition as the spouse of a United States citizen[,]”
which was a previously unavailable form of relief).
92. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3) (stating that “nor shall any motion to reopen for
the purpose of affording the alien an opportunity to apply for any form of discretion-
ary relief be granted if it appears that the alien’s right to apply for such relief was fully
explained to him or her and an opportunity to apply therefore was afforded at the
former hearing, unless the relief is sought on the basis of circumstances that have
arisen subsequent to the hearing”).
93. See R-R-, 20 I&N Dec. at 550 (“An alien must make a prima facie showing . . .
that he is statutorily eligible for the relief sought . . . .”).
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also warrant favorable discretion.94  An example of this basis for re-
opening would be if CIS approved an alien’s petition to adjust status
based on marriage to a U.S. citizen, but did so after the alien had been
ordered removed.95  The adjustment would not have been available
during the hearing, so the first element would be met.  And the CIS
approval would sufficiently demonstrate the alien’s likely prima facie
eligibility for relief to meet the second element and justify reopening.
The Attorney General may also avoid creating incentive for stalling
by refusing to reopen proceedings for those who only became eligible
“because of passage of time while their meritless appeals dragged
on.”96  This is not to say that such bad-faith dilatory motions and ap-
peals occur regularly, but the U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged
EOIR’s legitimate interest in preventing them.97 In INS v. Rios-
Pineda, a removable alien couple inter alia reached the continuous
physical presence requirement for cancellation of removal (then
known as “suspension of deportation”) by filing a series of frivolous
appeals.98  The Supreme Court found the appeals to be without sub-
stance,99 and upheld the BIA’s denial of the couple’s new relief
claim,100 noting that the judiciary should not encourage dilatory
motions.101
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Many immigration lawyers “show up five minutes before trial,”
leaving their client with an attorney who has “asked [the client] thirty
seconds’ worth of questions, done no research, gets no background
documents, and has told them nothing.”102  Because immigration
hearings are civil (as opposed to criminal) hearings, an alien does not
have the same rights that they would have in a criminal hearing,103
such as the right to government appointed counsel.104  But aliens may
94. Id. (“An alien must make a prima facie showing . . . that he warrants relief in
the exercise of discretion.”).
95. See M-S-, 22 I&N Dec at 357.
96. INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 450 (1995).
97. See id.
98. Id. at 447.
99. Id. at 450 (“No substance was found in any of the points raised on appeal, in
and of themselves, and we agree with the BIA that they were without merit.”).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 450–51 (“[T]he Attorney General and the INS confront an onerous task
without the addition of judicially augmented incentives to take meritless appeals, en-
gage in repeated violations, and undertake other conduct solely to drag out the depor-
tation process.”).
102. Richard L. Abel, Practicing Immigration Law in Filene’s Basement, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 1449, 1491 (2006) (internal quotations omitted).
103. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“Consistent with the civil
nature of the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context of a criminal
trial do not apply in a deportation hearing.”).
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2012) (specifying that the alien’s right to procure counsel is
“at no expense to the Government”).
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procure counsel at their own expense.105  Aliens also have a right to
expect counsel to be competent.106  As such, ineffective assistance of
counsel is a viable justification for reopening an immigration case.
To reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel, an alien must
meet three requirements: (1) the alien must show how the ineffective
assistance of counsel prejudiced the alien’s case; (2) the alien must
demonstrate that the allegedly ineffective attorney has been informed
of the claim; and (3) the alien must either show that the proper disci-
plinary authority has been notified, or that a legitimate reason exists
for not reporting the attorney.107  The prejudice caused by the alien’s
counsel must be substantial, such that the court would likely have
granted relief but for the attorney’s ineffective assistance.108  The re-
quirement that the alien file a complaint with the proper disciplinary
authority discourages collusion between client and counsel109 and
helps the court prevent future instances of similar ineffective assis-
tance.110  An alien’s belief that the prior counsel’s ineffective assis-
tance was inadvertent is an inadequate explanation for failure to
submit a bar complaint.111  To further discourage collusion, some cir-
cuits refuse to allow ineffective assistance claims while the alien is still
being represented by the allegedly ineffective lawyer.112
The BIA established the test for an alien trying to reopen a case
based on ineffective assistance of counsel in Matter of Lozada.113
There, an alien had been ordered removed for committing a crime of
moral turpitude.114  He informed the court of his intention to appeal,
105. Id. (stating that the alien “shall have the privilege of being represented . . . by
such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose”).
106. See, e.g., Lozada v. INS, 857 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1988) (defining substantial
ineffective assistance of counsel in a removal hearing as “denial of due process”).
107. See Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988) (listing the elements
for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
108. See Miranda-Lores v. INS, 17 F.3d 84, 85 (5th Cir. 1994) (specifying that
prejudice must be “substantial”).
109. Matter of Rivera-Claros, 21 I&N Dec. 599, 604, 607 (BIA 1996) (“It also
serves to protect against collusion between alien and counsel in which ‘ineffective’
assistance is tolerated, and goes unchallenged by an alien before disciplinary authori-
ties, because it results in a benefit to the alien in that delay can be a desired end
. . . .”).
110. Id. (“[W]e rely on the disciplinary process of the relevant jurisdiction’s bar as
the first, and ordinarily the fastest, means of identifying and correcting possible
misconduct.”).
111. Id. at 606 (“The respondent states that ‘if any error was made in this case it
was a postal error or an error of inadvertence by (former counsel).’ However, we
consider the respondent’s explanation . . . to be inadequate and to minimize signifi-
cantly the questions raised by the attorney’s apparent conduct.”).
112. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Morales v. Homan, 461 F.3d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 2006) (“It
would be unreasonable to require an alien to comply with Lozada, the necessary pre-
requisite to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim before the BIA, while still under
that counsel’s representation.”).
113. See Matter of Lozada, 19 I&N Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988).
114. Id. at 637–38.
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but  he never filed an appeal.115  A year later, the BIA dismissed his
appeal for failure to identify any error in the court’s decision.116  After
another six months had passed, his new attorney filed a motion to
reopen claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on the previ-
ous attorney’s failure to file an appeal brief.117  The BIA rejected the
motion but at the same time, announced the standard for future mo-
tions based on ineffective assistance.118  Since then, this has become
known as the Lozada standard,119 rendering the word Lozada synony-
mous with ineffective assistance of counsel.
4. No NTA
Slightly more than one-tenth of removals are ordered in absentia
because the alien failed to appear at the removal hearing.120  The most
obvious basis for reopening in absentia cases is notice failure.  The
Supreme Court has long recognized the due-process rights of aliens in
various immigration procedures.121  As such, an alien must receive the
traditional due-process elements of “notice” and “an opportunity to
be heard.”122
Notice failure can take two forms: either the alien never received
the original NTA giving notice that proceedings had begun,123 or the
alien never received the NOH giving notice of the removal hearing’s
time and place.124  If an alien either did not receive or could not be
charged with receipt of their NTA, the alien may motion the court to
reopen.125  There is no time-bar when an alien claims notice failure,
whether it is failure of NTA or NOH service.126
115. Id. at 638.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 638–39.
119. See, e.g., Matter of Assaad, 23 I&N Dec. 553, 557 (BIA 2003, Interim Decision
3487) (“The Lozada approach has provided an appropriate framework for analyzing
ineffective assistance claims . . . .”).
120. 2012 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, supra note 7, at H1.
121. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 31(1982) (“[A] resident alien re-
turning from a brief trip has a right to due process just as would a continuously pre-
sent resident alien.”).
122. Matter of G-Y-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 181, 186 (BIA 2001) (“Due process requires
that the alien be provided with notice of proceedings and an opportunity to be
heard.”) (internal quotations omitted).
123. Id. at 187–88 (discussing the NTA and requirements that the alien be apprised
of the duty to inform the government of the alien’s most recent address before con-
structive NOH service is possible).
124. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (2006) (“An order entered in absentia . . . may be
rescinded upon a motion to reopen filed at any time if the alien demonstrates that he
or she did not receive notice . . . .”).
125. G-Y-R-, 23 I&N Dec. at 187–88 (discussing constructive notice in circumstance
where the alien did not receive actual notice).
126. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (specifying that the alien may file a motion to reopen “at
any time” if the alien did not receive notice).
120 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
5. No NOH
Failure to receive an NOH is a bit more difficult to prove than fail-
ure to receive the NTA.  The immigration court itself sends out
NOHs.127  DHS does not.  As such, the alien is in a de facto adver-
sarial position against the court when making this claim because the
alien is claiming that the court itself either failed to provide notice of
the hearing date or it failed to properly determine notice prior to issu-
ing the in absentia order.128  Further, the alien is constructively served
with an NOH when the court sends the NOH to whatever address the
alien most recently provided.129  Because the NTA puts an alien on
notice of the duty to inform DHS and EOIR of any address changes,
if an alien moves and never receives an NOH sent to the old address,
the alien is still constructively served.130  As such, this is one of the
most difficult grounds for reopening to prove.
6. Exceptional Circumstances
An alien may also seek reopening of an in absentia order if “excep-
tional circumstances” prevented the alien from appearing.131  Mo-
tions based on exceptional circumstances are subject to a 180-day time
bar.132  Exceptional circumstances are: (1) death in the alien’s immedi-
ate family; (2) either the alien or an immediate family member was
seriously ill; or (3) domestic violence.133  No less serious circumstances
will substantiate a motion to reopen.134
127. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18 (“The Immigration Court shall be responsible for schedul-
ing the initial removal hearing and providing notice to the government and the alien
of the time, place, and date of hearing.”); see also IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE
MANUAL, supra note 33, at 65.
128. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (stating that the alien shall be removed only
upon “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that the written notice was pro-
vided); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.26(b) (2008) (permitting orders if “the Immigration Judge is
satisfied that written notice of the time and place of the proceedings and written no-
tice of the consequences of failure to appear . . . were provided to the respondent”).
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (“The written notice by the Attorney General shall
be considered sufficient for purposes of this subparagraph if provided at the most
recent address provided . . . .”).
130. § 1229a(b)(5)(B) (“No written notice shall be required . . . if the alien has
failed to provide the address required under section 1229(a)(1)(F) of this title.”).
131. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i) (“Such an order may be rescinded only upon a motion to
reopen . . . if the alien demonstrates that the failure to appear was because of excep-
tional circumstances . . . .”).
132. Id. (“Such an order may be rescinded only upon a motion to reopen filed
within 180 days after the date of the order of removal . . . .”).
133. § 1229a(e)(1) (providing examples “such as battery or extreme cruelty to the
alien or any child or parent of the alien, serious illness of the alien, serious illness or
death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien”); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.23(b)(4)(ii)–(iii).
134. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1) (excluding “less compelling circumstances”).
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7. Changed Country Conditions
Finally, an alien may challenge a final removal order if new condi-
tions arise in the alien’s destination country that would now qualify
the alien for asylum or withholding.135  This type of relief does not
apply to aliens removed in absentia.  An alien cannot show changed
country conditions when the alien never appeared to allege initial
country conditions.136  Further, an alien alleging changed country con-
ditions must merit favorable discretion.137
III. PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING GROUNDS FOR MOTIONS
TO REOPEN
Courts disfavor motions to reopen.138  There is an interest in finality
in any hearing, and immigration courts are interested in preventing
aliens from delaying their removal in perpetuity by filing successive
motions.139  As such, many of the bases for reopening are intention-
ally difficult.  The circumstances to justify them are rare.  Unfortu-
nately, many of these bases require such a perfect storm of unlikely
circumstances that they are de facto impossible to achieve.  Some ba-
ses have been subject to inconsistent application and definition, lead-
ing to confusion among immigration lawyers and courts alike as to
their requirements.  Others just need stronger enforcement of their
requirements to stem the flood of borderline frivolous motions.
A. Impossibility
One practical problem with the current legal bases for a motion to
reopen is that many of the circumstances that allow reopening are so
specific and rare that they are virtually impossible to attain.
135. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), 1158(a)(2)(D); see also Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I&N Dec.
247, 252 (BIA 2007).
136. See generally S-Y-G-, I&N Dec. at 252 (“Discretionary denials are appropriate
if the movant fails . . . to proffer material, previously unavailable evidence . . . .”).
137. Id. (“Discretionary denials are appropriate . . . if we are convinced that a
favorable exercise of discretion on the asylum application is unlikely . . . we are not
inclined to favorably exercise discretion in the case of an alien, such as the applicant,
who was previously found to have offered incredible testimony to gain immigration
benefits.”).
138. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (“Motions for reopening of immi-
gration proceedings are disfavored for the same reasons as are petitions for rehearing
and motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.”).
139. See id. (noting that “every delay works to the advantage of the deportable
alien who wishes merely to remain in the United States”); see also INS v. Abudu, 485
U.S. 94, 108 (1988) (“Granting such motions too freely will permit endless delay of
deportation by aliens creative and fertile enough to continuously produce new and
material facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case.”).
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1. New Evidence
New evidence would seem like the most obvious reason for reopen-
ing,140 but it is nearly impossible for an alien to meet the required
elements.  In short, an alien must: (1) find new evidence within ninety
days; (2) prove that it was unattainable at the original hearing; (3)
prove prima facie eligibility for relief with this new evidence; and (4)
prove that favorable discretion is merited.141
Combined, these requirements create a near insurmountable set of
obstacles.  First, there is the time bar.142  An alien must submit the
motion to reopen within ninety days of the removal order.143  Second,
the alien must prove that the evidence was unattainable at the original
hearing.144 Therein lies a paradox: if an alien can find new evidence
within ninety days of the removal order, the alien will have a difficult
time proving that the evidence was unattainable by reasonable mea-
sures prior to the order.  If circumstances rendered the evidence truly
unattainable, the alien will not likely be able to discover it and file a
motion within ninety days.  This creates a near insurmountable bar.
But even if an alien is able to overcome this bar, he or she will only be
half-way to sustaining a motion to reopen.
If the alien manages to find previously unavailable evidence within
the statutory timeframe, the alien must still prove both the evidence’s
substantial probative value145 and that the alien merits favorable dis-
cretion.146  Essentially, the alien must prove in a motion that this new
evidence would have likely been sufficient to justify relief at the origi-
nal hearing.  Then the alien’s motion must also show that the alien
merits favorable discretion.  If the alien was eligible at the hearing,
but the IJ found that the alien did not merit discretion, it is highly
unlikely that a single piece of evidence alone could create favorable
discretion.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 83–84.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 86–90.
142. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2006) (establishing a ninety-day time bar).
143. Id.
144. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it
appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not avail-
able and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”);
§ 1003.23(b)(3) (stating the same standard for a motion to reopen before an IJ).
145. See Matter of R-R-, 20 I&N Dec. 547, 550 (BIA 1992) (“An alien must make a
prima facie showing both that he is statutorily eligible for the relief sought . . . .”); see
also Matter of M-S-, 22 I&N Dec. 349, 357 (BIA 1999) (ruling that “the Board will
look to whether the alien has proffered sufficient evidence to indicate that there is a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits”).
146. R-R-, 20 I&N Dec. at 550 (“An alien must make a prima facie showing . . . that
he warrants relief in the exercise of discretion.”).
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2. New Forms of Relief
A motion to reopen based on new relief becoming available faces
some of the same obstacles as a motion based on new evidence.  Es-
sentially, a new form of relief must become available during the same
narrow timeframe that is required of new evidence: ninety days.147
And the relief must not have been available at the previous hearing.148
If the relief was available, but the alien pursued other legal options
instead, then the immigration court will deny a motion to reopen.149
The relief must have been entirely unavailable.  The alien also still
needs to prove prima facie eligibility, but this is less difficult than
proving the probative value of new evidence because the alien will
ostensibly be eligible if new relief has become available.  The difficult
issue is the extreme unlikelihood of entirely new relief becoming
available during the ninety-day window.
3. The Alien Never Received an NTA
Another form of a reopening motion that has virtually no chance of
success is the claim that the alien never received an NTA.  It would
seem the obvious claim to an immigration lawyer for the alien who
comes into the office having been ordered removed and claiming to
not understand why.  But the statute and case law are stacked in the
government’s favor.  When DHS encounters an alien and puts that
alien into proceedings, the government usually serves the alien with
an NTA in person.150  While a few divisions of DHS will mail NTAs to
the alien, these are the exception and not the rule.  And even those
cases may fall under constructive service.151
B. Confusion
Some bases for reopening are inherently confusing, leaving the
alien’s counsel unsure of the requirements, and breeding needless
litigation.
147. § 1003.2(c)(2) (requiring that a “motion must be filed no later than 90 days
after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered”).
148. § 1003.2(c)(1) (stating that the BIA must be satisfied that the relief was un-
available); § 1003.23(b)(3) (stating that the IJ must be satisfied that the relief was
unavailable).
149. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3) (requiring that “nor shall any motion to reopen
for the purpose of affording the alien an opportunity to apply for any form of discre-
tionary relief be granted if it appears that the alien’s right to apply for such relief was
fully explained to him or her and an opportunity to apply therefore was afforded at
the former hearing”).
150. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2012) (requiring that “written notice . . . shall be
given in person to the alien”) (emphasis added).
151. See § 1229(c) (“Service by mail . . . shall be sufficient if there is proof of at-
tempted delivery to the last address provided by the alien . . . .”).
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1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Of all the existing legal grounds for a motion to reopen, the one
that has caused the most confusion for immigration lawyers, the gov-
ernment, and the courts alike is the Lozada standard for ineffective
assistance of counsel.
The first issue with the current Lozada standard is that there is no
definitive answer as to how incompetent an attorney must be to “sub-
stantially” prejudice an alien’s case.  The definition of “substantial
prejudice” is that if-but-for the attorney’s incompetent actions, the
alien would have received relief.152  But the question of whether a
specific action falls into this category is still a case-by-case decision.
The second issue with a Lozada claim is that many immigration law-
yers are hesitant to report their colleagues to state bar disciplinary
authorities.  Because Lozada requires an alien to either report the
previous attorney, or show good cause for not reporting the attorney,
many immigration lawyers have experimented with excuses.  The BIA
has not been receptive.  One reason, which has utterly failed, is that
the previous attorney’s error was an “honest mistake.”  The BIA re-
jected this reasoning in Matter of Rivera-Claros.153  In that case the
alien claimed that his attorney was doing good work for indigent im-
migrants, that it was an honest mistake, and that he did not want to
harm the other immigrants for whom the attorney was working.154
The BIA flatly rejected these reasons.155  If the attorney was ineffec-
tive, then whatever work the attorney is doing for other immigrants is,
at best, suspect.156
Additionally, when ineffective assistance leads to an in absentia re-
moval, even the BIA is confused.  A lawyer’s incompetence should
theoretically be a non-issue when the alien failed to appear at the
hearing.  But there have been cases where a lawyer caused the alien to
fail to appear—either by failing to tell the alien about the hearing,157
telling the alien not to appear,158 or providing the wrong date or time
to the alien.159  The prejudice this causes to the case should be obvi-
152. See generally Miranda-Lores v. INS, 17 F.3d 84, 85 (5th Cir. 1994) (“In this
case, proving prejudice requires the Petitioner to make a prima facie showing that had
the application been filed, he would have been entitled to relief . . . .”).
153. Matter of Rivera-Claros, 21 I&N Dec. 599, 599 (BIA 1996).
154. Id. at 603 (“[T]he respondent asserts that she does not wish to file a complaint
against her former counsel.  The respondent, in her declaration, states that ‘if any
error was made in this case, it was . . . an error of inadvertence . . . .’”).
155. Id. at 603 (holding that “we find this to be an inadequate explanation”).
156. See id. at 604 (“[T]his process . . . highlights the standards which should be
expected of attorneys who represent aliens in immigration proceedings.”).
157. See, e.g., Miguel Gutierrez-Ochoa, A095 439 049, 2010 WL 2390771 at *2 (BIA
May 4, 2010) (unpublished).
158. E.g., Matter of Grijalva-Barrera, 21 I&N Dec. 472 (BIA 1996, Interim Deci-
sion 3284).
159. E.g., Liang Qing Jiang, A076 505 249, 2012 WL 3911858 (BIA Aug. 29, 2012)
(unpublished).
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ous: if-but-for the failure to appear, the alien could have put on a case.
The BIA has attempted to remedy this by defining the lawyer’s in-
competence as an “exceptional circumstance.”160  This essentially “in-
corporated” Lozada claims into exceptional circumstance motions for
in absentia removals, in a manner similar to the United States Su-
preme Court’s incorporation of rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.161
This patchwork solution has multiple drawbacks.  First, it creates
confusion regarding the time bar.  An alien has ninety days to file a
Lozada motion.162  But an alien has 180 days to file an exceptional
circumstance motion.163  Which time bar applies to an in absentia
Lozada claim, given that the BIA treats such claims as exceptional
circumstances?  It would be unfair to give non-appearing aliens twice
as much time as those who diligently appeared for their hearing.  But
it would be equally unfair to give some in absentia cases only half the
time as others.  The BIA typically applies the 180-day time bar to
these claims,164 though there is no stated reasoning for choosing this
time bar over the standard Lozada time bar, particularly when inef-
fective assistance claims are rooted in case law, not statute.  And the
BIA has never analyzed the conflict between the two types of Lozada
time bars.
Another problem is that ineffective assistance is arguably less com-
pelling than death, serious illness, and domestic violence.  This would
mean that the BIA ran afoul of statute by defining ineffective assis-
tance as an exceptional circumstance.165  But so far, no court has chal-
lenged it on this matter.
In early 2009, outgoing Attorney General Michael Mukasey at-
tempted to fix the current Lozada framework, ordering the BIA to
consider a new process whereby an alien would send a signed but un-
filed bar complaint to the BIA along with the motion to reopen.166
160. Grijalva-Barrera, 21 I&N Dec. at 474 (“[T]he level of incompetence involved
in this case establishes that the respondent’s absence was the result of exceptional
circumstances . . . .”).
161. See generally id.
162. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2006) (establishing the general ninety-day time
bar for motions to reopen).
163. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (applying a general 180-day time bar for in absentia
removals).
164. See generally Matter of Lei, 22 I&N Dec. 113 (BIA 1998, Interim Decision
3356).
165. Compare Grijalva-Barrera, 21 I&N Dec. at 474 (explaining that “the level of
incompetence involved in this case establishes that the respondent’s absence was the
result of exceptional circumstances”), with 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1) (2012) (explaining
exceptional circumstances as, for example, “battery or extreme cruelty to the alien or
any child or parent of the alien, serious illness of the alien, or serious illness or death
of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien, but not including less compelling circum-
stances”) (emphasis added).
166. Matter of Compean, 24 I&N Dec. 710, 737 (A.G. Jan. 7, 2009) (Compean I)
(“[T]he alien must attach a completed and signed complaint addressed to the appro-
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The BIA would then review the case, and send the complaint to the
appropriate state bar if the complaint seemed legitimate.167  But
Mukasey’s order also claimed that although EOIR could allow an
alien to reopen based on ineffective assistance, reopening was not
mandatory because aliens did not have a right to effective assis-
tance.168  This lasted six months.  Incoming Attorney General Eric
Holder overruled this framework in the summer of 2009.169  While ac-
knowledging problems with the Lozada framework, Attorney Gen-
eral Holder indicated a belief that Attorney General Mukasey’s
solutions went too far.170  He ordered the BIA to analyze Lozada to
consider improvements.171  But the BIA has made no further serious
public efforts to change the Lozada requirements.
2. The Alien Never Received the NOH
The claim that an alien never received an NOH will face many of
the same difficulties as the claim that an alien never received an
NTA.172  But with this motion attorneys will sometimes mistakenly
claim that their client never received an NTA when they mean to say
the client never received an NOH.173  Maybe the attorneys are con-
fused.  It would be understandable because the distinction sometimes
even confuses the BIA.174  Maybe they simply do not know the differ-
ence between the two documents.  Either way, claiming that an alien
never received an NTA will lead to failure when DHS submits a copy
of the signed NTA, regardless of whether the alien or attorney in-
tended to claim that the alien never received the NOH.
A further problem with the NOH claim is that the court construc-
tively serves the alien by sending the NOH to the alien’s last known
priate State bar or disciplinary authorities . . . the alien need not actually file the
complaint . . . .”) vacated, 25 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA June 3, 2009).
167. Id. at 737–38 (noting the law “leav[es] it to the Board whether to refer the
complaint to the State bar”).
168. Id. at 710 (“Aliens in removal proceedings have no right to counsel . . . . Al-
though the Constitution and immigration laws do not entitle an alien in removal pro-
ceedings to relief for his lawyer’s mistakes, the Department of Justice may, as a
matter of administrative grace, reopen removal proceedings where an alien shows
that he was prejudiced by the actions of private counsel.”).
169. Matter of Compean, 25 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA June 3, 2009) (Compean II).
170. Id. at 3 (“[T]he introduction of a new procedural framework depended in part
on Attorney General Mukasey’s conclusion that there is no constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings.”).
171. Id. at 2 (“I direct the Acting Director of the Executive Office for Immigration
Review to initiate procedures as soon as practicable to evaluate the Lozada frame-
work and to determine what modifications should be proposed for public
consideration.”).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 150–51.
173. See, e.g., Kenneth Solotis-Nwanko, A46 116 812, 2005 WL 1766748 (BIA May
5, 2005) (unpublished) (providing example where the BIA reverses itself and admits
that it erroneously granted a motion to reopen because both it and the respondent
confused the NOH for an NTA).
174. See id. at *2.
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address.175  If the court had any indication that the alien failed to re-
ceive the NOH (such as the post office returning the NOH undeliv-
ered), the court would never have proceeded in absentia.176  If the
alien had filed a change of address, as required, the court would have
sent the NOH to the updated address.177  As such, in most cases the
alien will have lost this motion before even filing it.
C. Need Better Bright-Line Rules
Some bases for reopening an immigration case have set bright-line
requirements but are couched in language that nevertheless breeds
litigation.  These bases for reopening simply need to be re-expressed
in clearer language.
1. Exceptional Circumstances
There are only three “exceptional circumstances” that will allow the
court to reopen an in absentia removal order: death in the alien’s im-
mediate family; serious illness; and domestic violence.178  If an alien
misses a hearing for one of these three reasons, then the court rescinds
the removal order and reopens the case.179  These are the only “excep-
tional circumstances” that will allow the immigration courts to reopen
a case180 (other than the BIA’s odd incorporation of Lozada claims
into exceptional circumstances for certain in absentia cases,181 and the
BIA’s occasional and inexplicable inconsistency).182  Further, excep-
tional circumstances do not apply to hearings the alien actually ap-
peared—it is only a basis for reopening in absentia hearings.183
175. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c) (2012) (“Service by mail under this section shall be
sufficient if there is proof of attempted delivery to the last address provided by the
alien . . . .”).
176. See § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (stating that the alien shall be removed only upon “clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that the written notice was provided).
177. E.g., Gomez-Palacios v. Holder, 560 F.3d 354, 360 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n
alien’s failure to receive actual notice of a removal hearing due to his neglect of his
obligation to keep the immigration court apprised of his current mailing address does
not mean that the alien ‘did not receive notice.’”).
178. § 1229a(e)(1) (“The term ‘exceptional circumstances’ refers to exceptional cir-
cumstances (such as battery or extreme cruelty to the alien or any child or parent of
the alien, serious illness of the alien, or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or
parent of the alien, but not including less compelling circumstances) beyond the con-
trol of the alien.”).
179. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i) (permitting reopening of case “if the alien demonstrates
that the failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances”).
180. See § 1229a(e)(1) (prohibiting reopening for “less compelling circumstances”).
181. See supra notes 160–65.
182. See, e.g., Juan Manuel Jaimes-Rosad, A077 087 574, 2010 WL 1747380 (BIA
Apr. 20, 2010) (unpublished) (ruling that automobile failure was an exceptional cir-
cumstance because it was beyond the alien’s control); but see Matter of S-A-, 21 I&N
Dec. 1050 (BIA 1997, Interim Decision 3331) (holding that heavy traffic causing the
alien to miss a hearing was not beyond the alien’s control).
183. See § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i) (stating that the alien must prove that exceptional cir-
cumstances caused a failure to appear).
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The problem with this basis is the name: “exceptional circum-
stances.”  Despite the statutory definition, many attorneys will still
claim circumstances other than those listed to be exceptional.184  This
wastes the court’s time.  It wastes DHS’s time.  And it wastes the
alien’s resources on a futile motion.
2. Changed Country Conditions
Like exceptional circumstances, the major point of confusion with
changed country conditions is in the name itself.  Because there is no
bright-line rule, virtually anything in the country that is worse than it
was when the alien tried and failed to attain asylum could be a
“changed country condition.”  But the BIA has clearly stated that a
mere incremental worsening of existing conditions will not suffice to
reopen an alien’s case.185
IV. RECOMMENDED REFORMS FOR POST-CONCLUSION
MOTIONS PRACTICE
It would be easy for Congress or EOIR to simplify the post-conclu-
sion process.  Congress could amend 8 U.S.C. to reflect a new process,
or the Attorney General could amend 8 C.F.R. to reflect new rules.  A
three-prong approach would create a process that is both more equita-
ble to the alien and more efficient for the government.  This approach
would: (A) replace all discretionary bases for reopening with
mandatory bright-line rules; (B) clarify existing bright-line rules that
currently cause confusion; and (C) police the private bar to deter mer-
itless motions. This would not solve every problem with motions to
reopen or address every possible scenario.  That would likely be im-
possible, given the complexity of immigration laws and the myriad
possible factual circumstances. But this three-prong approach would
streamline the process and be an improvement over the current
structure.
A. From Discretionary to Mandatory Reopening
The key problem with discretionary reopening is that it breeds
needless litigation.  Currently, reopening a closed immigration case is
184. See, e.g., S-A-, 21 I&N Dec. at 1050 (heavy traffic); Iveth Cristina Valenzuela-
Gradis, A099 661 476, 2012 WL 3277128 (BIA July 12, 2012) (unpublished) (involving
alien who wrongly assumed the IJ would grant a continuance); Ismael Morfi Valdes,
A94 896 569, 2008 WL 3861947 (BIA July 14, 2008) (unpublished) (involving financial
hardship for alien to travel to hearing).
185. See Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 247, 257 (BIA 2007) (“Change that is
incremental or incidental does not meet the regulatory requirements . . . . [A] new
report or new law is not evidence of changed conditions without convincing evidence
that the prior version of the law was different, or was differently enforced, in some
relevant and material way.”).
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essentially an exercise of the Attorney General’s discretion.186 As
such, aliens may file motions, which otherwise fail every legal basis for
reopening, in hopes of receiving favorable discretion.  And some
aliens who merit relief may be denied because they are unable to con-
vince an IJ to show favorable discretion.
But removal of discretionary factors would only be the first half of
this prong.  The other half would be to temper the adversarial factors
in these cases.  Without a need for favorable discretion, EOIR could
review cases sua sponte without any input from ICE.187  The alien’s
case either does or does not merit reopening.  If the case reopens, ICE
would return as prosecutor.  But with no discretionary factors, EOIR
could objectively review cases to determine whether the case merits
reopening solely as a matter of law.
1. Mandatory Reopening
If all discretionary factors were removed, EOIR could focus solely
on whether an alien’s case merits reopening as a matter of law.  It
would no longer be a question of whether the courts “should” reopen
a case.  It would be a question of whether the courts “must” reopen a
case.  With new evidence, new form of relief, and changed country
condition claims, this would allow the court to focus on the eligibility
elements for each claim, without considering whether the alien merits
favorable discretion.  The remaining elements would not change—the
court would simply no longer need to consider whether the alien mer-
its favorable discretion.  Notice failure, exceptional circumstance, and
Lozada claims already function this way.  If the alien meets the ele-
ments for the specific basis of reopening, the court reopens the case.
Extending this mandatory framework to the remaining grounds for
reopening will serve to prevent meritless “sob-story” motions, while
creating more certainty of relief for aliens who truly merit it.
The opposite side of the “mandatory reopening” coin would be
“mandatory non-reopening.”  One aspect of motions to reopen that
should not change is the numerical bar.188  Aliens are currently barred
from filing more than one motion to reopen.189  This promotes finality
and endeavors to ensure that only meritorious motions get filed.190
The other aspect that should not change is the ninety-day time bar.  In
fact, Congress could tighten up this requirement by making the time
bar a jurisdictional bar instead of a statutory element of reopening.
186. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (“[T]he Attorney General has ‘broad
discretion’ to grant or deny such motions.”).
187. See infra text accompanying notes 192–95.
188. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2012) (“An alien may file one motion to reo-
pen proceedings . . . .”) (emphasis added).
189. Id.
190. Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 976, 984 (BIA 1997) (“These rules are meant to
bring finality to immigration proceedings and to redress the problem of abuses result-
ing from the filing of successive or frivolous motions.”).
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After all, Congress has already jurisdictionally barred review in some
circumstances.191  This would protect the government’s interest in fi-
nality, while protecting aliens from attorneys who would take their
money to pursue a hopeless attempt to toll the time bar.
2. Sua Sponte Review of New Evidence and New Forms of Relief
Because new evidence and new forms of relief are largely illusory,
the current structure is ripe for a drastic change.  The most logical
form that this could take would be to allow the alien to motion the
court to hear new evidence or to consider new relief under the court’s
sua sponte authority.  Immigration courts may already reopen cases
sua sponte in the most extreme circumstances.192  And despite the self-
contradictory language of “motioning” a court to take sua sponte ac-
tion, it is an accepted practice at EOIR.193  This would take ICE out
of the loop, allowing the alien a direct line to EOIR during the ninety
days that they have to file a motion.
This structure would solve everyone’s problems.  It would free up
ICE to focus resources on active cases.  It would allow the alien un-
challenged access to EOIR for ninety days following the removal or-
der.  And it would allow EOIR to more quickly adjudicate motions
because the IJ could make the determination without a full adver-
sarial hearing.
The basic elements of a new evidence or new relief claim would not
change.  The courts are capable of determining whether a new piece of
evidence or form of relief was reasonably available during the original
hearing.  Since the court is both trier of law and fact, the court can
also determine whether new evidence is material.
The only elements that would suggest a need for an adversarial pro-
cess would be whether the new evidence is likely to change the case’s
outcome, or whether an alien is likely to merit the new relief.  The
solution would be to make these a low bar.  If there is any likelihood
that the new evidence would realistically change the outcome, reopen-
ing would be mandatory.  Or if there is any likelihood of prevailing on
a new form of relief, reopening would be mandatory.  Essentially, if
the alien meets the first element of showing reasonable unavailability,
they would only fail to reopen for new evidence if the new evidence
did not address each element where they failed at trial (or if they
failed to address a prima facie element of a new form of relief).
191. See § 1231(a)(5) (2006) (stripping jurisdiction from all courts in reinstatement
cases).
192. See Matter of G-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1132, 1133–34 (BIA 1999) (discussing the
respondent’s motion to reopen sua sponte, but denying the motion because the cir-
cumstances were not exceptional enough to merit sua sponte reopening).
193. See id.
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3. Sua Sponte Review of Notice
Immigration courts already review notice prior to issuing in absentia
removal orders.194  An IJ will not allow the hearing to continue in
absentia or issue a removal order if the IJ finds a failure of either the
NTA or NOH’s service.195  If an alien requests the court to reopen
based on notice failure, the court can review whether the alien con-
structively received the NTA or NOH from the existing record.  There
is no need to involve ICE to provide an adversarial viewpoint.  Essen-
tially, an alien should be able to submit a notice failure claim on a
boilerplate form to the court, and the court should be able to respond
without requiring a formal motion.
4. Sua Sponte Review of Changed Country Conditions
If a country’s conditions have changed enough to merit reopening,
then it should be obvious from the U.S. Country Reports.  EOIR
should publicize when these changed conditions occur and allow or
refuse motions to reopen for changed conditions based on this report.
There should be no question when an alien files on this basis as to
whether the alien should be allowed to reopen a case.  And because
country conditions either do or do not support reopening, there is no
need for ICE to offer a counter-viewpoint.  This too should fall under
EOIR’s sua sponte authority.
B. Better Bright-Line Rules
The only places where the current rules create so much confusion as
to create a need for better rules are in (1) Lozada claims and (2) ex-
ceptional circumstance claims.
1. Lozada Simplification
The confusing Lozada standards for ineffective assistance of coun-
sel should be overhauled.  First, the Attorney General should find that
Lozada outright applies natively to in absentia hearings, as it does al-
ready in hearings where the alien attended.  The BIA’s patchwork so-
lution of deciding that such a claim is an exceptional circumstance has
created more problems than it has solved.  If ineffective assistance of
counsel were a native basis for reopening an immigration case, regard-
less of whether the case was adjudicated in absentia, then aliens and
attorneys alike would be on notice as to the specific required elements
and the applicable time bar.  This would also streamline motions for in
absentia cases because immigration lawyers would no longer waste
time stringing together “incorporation” style arguments.
194. See § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (stating that the alien shall be removed only upon “clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that the written notice was provided).
195. Id.
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A second reform that would improve the existing Lozada frame-
work would be to reinstate those portions of the first Compean deci-
sion that streamlined the filing process.196  By overruling the entire
decision, Attorney General Holder threw the proverbial baby out
with the bathwater.197  Rather than flooding state bar associations
with alien complaints,198 or flooding immigration courts with motions
doomed by their failure to report attorneys to the bar,199 the BIA
could take on the role of filter.200  An alien could send a signed (but
unsent) bar complaint to the BIA along with the motion to reopen, in
lieu of the filing the complaint prior to making a Lozada claim.201
Then the BIA could either discipline the ineffective attorney di-
rectly202 or report the attorney to the state bar association.203
2. Name the Circumstances
The term “exceptional circumstances” has long been a litigation
breeder in the immigration field.  Because it only applies to three spe-
cific circumstances in in absentia cases, it will be easier to clarify.  All
EOIR needs to do is rename this basis.  Instead of “exceptional cir-
cumstances,” EOIR could adopt a more specific and descriptive name.
For example, EOIR could call this basis for reopening “Non-Appear-
ance for Death, Illness, or Domestic Violence.”  This name might not
roll off the tongue as easily as “exceptional circumstances,” but it will
solve most of the current problems with this reopening basis.  It will
bring an end to the practice of claiming exceptional circumstances in
cases where the alien actually appeared, because the term “non-ap-
pearance” is in the title.  It will also end the practice of immigration
lawyers wrongfully claiming circumstances other than those statutorily
identified to be “exceptional,” because the title itself lists the three
acceptable circumstances.
C. Better Policing of the Private Immigration Bar
The cornerstone of any post-conclusion reform will be better polic-
ing of the private immigration bar.  Problems with the private immi-
gration bar are no secret, but malpractice is grossly underreported to
196. See generally Matter of Compean, 24 I&N Dec. 710, 737–38 (A.G.  January 7,
2009) (Compean I).
197. See generally Matter of Compean, 25 I&N Dec. 1, 1 (BIA June 3, 2009) (Com-
pean II).
198. See Compean I, 24 I&N at 737 (“[I]t appears that Lozada may inadvertently
have contributed to the filing of many unfounded or even frivolous complaints.”).
199. E.g., Comfort Afua Afarbea Koli A.K.A. Comfort Araribea Woods, A099 173
114, 2012 WL 1705670 (BIA Apr. 11, 2012) (unpublished); Jose Rufino Mena-Her-
rera, A029 192 836, 2009 WL 888469 (BIA Mar. 13, 2009) (unpublished); Maryam
Jafar Shirley, A28 660 098, 2007 WL 275803 (BIA Jan. 22, 2007) (unpublished).
200. See Compean I, 24 I&N at 737–38.
201. Id.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 207–11.
203. See Compean I, 24 I&N at 737–38.
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state bar associations.204  A 2012 American Bar Journal article noted
immigrants are “susceptible to unscrupulous, or careless, lawyers be-
cause of language barriers and their reluctance to initiate contact with
government authorities in efforts to undo the mistakes of counsel.”205
Some have gone so far as to say that immigrants are sometimes “bet-
ter off pro se.”206  The BIA currently disciplines private attorneys by
forbidding them from practicing in immigration courts or before CIS
officers.207  But so far, this has only occurred in the most egregious
cases.
The private bar creates some of the problems with the current post-
conclusion motion structure because some attorneys file motions re-
gardless of their merit.  EOIR has failed to deter private immigration
lawyers from filing such frivolous motions.  But the blame does not
fall solely on the BIA.  A legal framework for such sanctions simply
does not exist.  Immigration courts are not Article III courts.  Con-
gress has given IJs the legal authority to sanction attorneys for con-
tempt.208  But this authority is limited to the regulations set out by the
Attorney General.209  And no Attorney General has ever written such
a regulation into 8 C.F.R. to complete this authority for IJs.  So far,
only the BIA enjoys disciplinary authority in the regulations.210  This
leaves IJs powerless to sanction those who come before them.  Attor-
neys can only be disciplined under the BIA’s narrow authority or by
referral to their state bar.  The Attorney General could easily amend 8
C.F.R. to allow IJs to automatically sanction private attorneys for friv-
olous motions because 8 U.S.C. already authorizes him to make such
an amendment.211  Granting IJs sanction authority would ensure that
attorneys only file the most meritorious of post-conclusion motions.
Without the possibility of sanctions, attorneys could still file motions
that have no hope of success on behalf of aliens willing to pay for one
last shot.  If there are negative consequences for wasting the court’s
time, attorneys will be less willing to take an alien’s money in ex-
change for false hope.
204. See G. M. Filisko, Hot Zone: Immigration Law Raises a Unique Mix of Ethics




206. Davis, supra note 1, at 141.
207. See EOIR FACT SHEET, supra note 22; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2012).
208. § 1229a(b)(1) (“The immigration judge shall have authority (under regulations
prescribed by the Attorney General) to sanction by civil money penalty any action (or
inaction) in contempt of the judge’s proper exercise of authority . . . .”).
209. Id.
210. See 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(a)(1) (1996) (granting the BIA the authority to punish
attorneys).
211. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2012).
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V. CONCLUSION
The current structure for post-conclusion immigration motions
practice is confusing and inefficient.  Some bases for reopening are
impossible to attain because of their own requirements.  Some are so
confusing that neither aliens, attorneys, nor the courts completely un-
derstand them.  And others invite abuse and frivolous filings.  But
there is no one-size-fits-all solution.  Any effort to restructure post-
conclusion motions must employ a multi-prong approach because no
single common denominator drives all of the problems.  Such a reform
should include the following: (1) all discretionary grounds for reopen-
ing should become mandatory and come under the court’s sua sponte
authority; (2) EOIR must clarify all currently unclear standards; and
(3) EOIR must increase efforts to police the private bar, specifically
granting IJs the regulatory authority to sanction attorneys.
Transforming reopening from discretionary to mandatory will solve
many of the current structure’s problems.  It will provide aliens notice
of exactly which elements they must satisfy to reopen a case.  It will
protect aliens who meet the elements from being removed simply be-
cause the judge thinks that the alien does not merit favorable discre-
tion.  It will also reduce the number of meritless motions to reopen,
because aliens who do not meet the requirements will no longer try to
reopen solely on a compelling story for favorable discretion (i.e., by
tugging on a judge’s heartstrings).  It will also set the stage for remov-
ing ICE from the post-conclusion equation, because courts can judge
the merits of a reopening request under their existing sua sponte
authority.
Clarifying existing bright-line rules and better policing of the pri-
vate bar will also clean up the post-conclusion environment.  Simplify-
ing the requirements for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and
clarifying the standards for an exceptional circumstance claim are two
easy steps EOIR could take to streamline the post-conclusion process.
Better policing of the private bar would solve a large swath of
problems.  It would deter frivolous motions, and it would allow the
BIA to ensure that aliens who hire immigration lawyers receive an
acceptable level of quality.
These steps would solve many of the problems with the current
post-conclusion environment.  While no single restructuring, overhaul,
or reform could solve all of the immigration system’s problems, these
simple steps could solve the problems inherent in this one area of im-
migration law.
